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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
:-;T.\'rE OF l'T.\11, by and through 
it~ HO.\ D CO~I ~IISSION, 
!'huin I iff a 11d Appellant, 
-v:-;.-
FIL\~ 1\ .\. \rOOLLEY, et al., 
!Jej'endauls and Respondents. 
Case K o. 9966 
BRIEF OF RESP'ONDENT 
X.ATURE OF THE CASE 
Thi~ ~nit is an eminent d01nain proceeding initiated 
by tl1e appellant to condemn lands of the respondents to 
bt, usPd in eonnect.ion with the construction and operation 
pf Hig-hway Project I-S0-±(8)-190. 
In thi::; brief appellants will be referred to as the 
"~tatt'" and respondents ·will be referred to as the "Land-
owner." 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COUR1, 
The issue of the necessity for the taking was heard 
by the Third District Court before the Honorable A. H. 
Ellett, sitting without a jury, at Coalville, Summit 
County, on April 25, 1963. The Court entered judgment 
on that issue against the Landowner and in favor of 
the State and no appeal has been taken therefrom. 
The r·emaining issue of compensation to the Land-
owner was tried the same date before Judge Ellett, sit-
ting with a jury. The Court entered judgment against 
the State and in favor of the Landowner in the sum of 
$20,000.00. Subsequently, the State's motion for a remit-
titur of the verdict and, in the alternative, a new trial 
was denied by the trial court. 
RELIEF SOUGH·T ON APPEAL 
By this appeal the State seeks a reversal of the 
judgment of the District Court as to the jury verdict of 
$20,000.00 and remanding the case for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Landowner generally agrees with the statement 
of facts set forth in the State's brief. The statement is 
not entirely accurate in the assertion that there are no 
improvements (Brief-3). The lands designated by the 
Stat~e's witness as me,adowland have been fenced (Tr.-74) 
and there is a developed source of water (Tr.-73). 
Also, the statement in the brief at page 3 that "the 
subject property does not, and did not at the time of 
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3 
taking. continue to the State line" is an inaccurate state-
ment. The larl< l taken does continue to and is adjacent to 




TllE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EX-
CLUDING SALES PRICE8 WHICH WERE 
OFFERED BY THE STATE'S WITNESS 
FRED FROERER. 
This Court has laid down the rule that evidence of 
tlthl't' ~all'~ may be used in support of an opinion of value 
in an eminent domain proceeding, subject to the condi-
tion that it be shown that there is sufficient similarity 
hetwt~en the properties, State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 
3li, 366 P.2d 76, 1961; St,ate v. Peek, 1 Ut1ah 2d 263, 
:!t)5 p .~d 630, 1953. 
If sales prices of other lands relate to sales that are 
not rea~onably comparable, evidence relating to those 
~mit's is not admissible. This Court has recognized that 
no two parcels of real estate are exactly alike. Neverthe-
lt'='<', evidence of other sales is admissible if it should ap-
pear that the lands are generally similar, particularly 
a=- to factors having a bearing on value, such as loc~ation, 
a~tual or potential uses, terms of payment, and that the 
other sales were close enough in time that circumstances 
had not changed as to have that effect. In the absence 
of reasonable comparability, testimony as to other sales 
i<' clearly inadmissible, State v. Peterson, supra. 
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The witness for the State testified briefly as to 
only one sale. The extent of his testimony was that: 
"A. I found on investigation at the Uinta 
County, Wyoming records, if I can consult my 
notes, the sale of 180 acres of land adjoining the 
City of Evanston on the west, which would he be-
tween the City of Evanston and the \Vyoming-
Utah border, that a deed was reoorded in Book 
244. Page 136, from Florence B. Elsinore and 
others." (Tr.-71) 
No foundation what·ever was given to show that the 
sale was the sale of comparable lands. No testimony was 
given as to the use of the land, the terrain, whether or 
not the sale refer1~ed to was voluntary, whether the terms 
orf payment were not so extended as to make a substantial 
difference in the price, or any other factor that would 
indicate even the slightest degree of comparability be-
tween the lands involved in said sale and the lands being 
taken in this case. 
l\1:oreover, the Court did not exclude any testimony 
relating to comparable sal·es except in this one case 
where the price, alone, was excluded. The Court ruled 
that the price only should he left out and that counsel 
could go on with his examination (Tr.-71, 72). No other 
testin1ony was adduced as to any sales whatever. 
The witness did say that he had talked to another 
appraiser in Wyoming in regard to the location of a 
reservoir site at Randolph, Utah, and that lands there 
were considered to be comparable to the lands being 
taken in this case ('Tr.-72). No evidence whatever was 
adduced to indicate thwt the lands were comparable. The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ha1·e statt-tm·nt of a witness, without any other founda-
ticm, that lands an· comparable does not make them such. 
Tlw absence of any showing whatever of physical 
and Pnvi ronmental characteristics of lands involved in 
other sales that would indicate comparability or any 
slwwi.ng that the terms of the s·ales were comparable 
W1H1ld makP any evidence of sales prices inadmissible and 
n<·c·ordinp;ly the trial court did not err in excluding sales 
pncPs (-! 1Y ichol~ on E1ninent Domain, 3rd Ed., 12.311 
[c)). 
~loreover, the opinion value stated by the State's 
witrws~ .JI r. Froerer, was not materially contested by the 
Landowner insofar as it related to approximately 76 
ot' the 77 acres involved in the taking. 
rrhP Landowner te·stified that a portion of the prop-
erty hPing taken, described as having a 200-foot frontage 
and 143-foot depth at or near the State line, had value for 
commercial purposes. The Landowner's testimony as to 
the remaining 76 or so acres was as follows: 
"Q. Now will you come hack with me, ple;ase, 
do you have any opinion as to the reas·onable mar-
ket value of this particular agricultural ground 
as of Febn1ary 18 of this year~ 
"A. Well, I have an opinion but I would 
leave that. I think I am not qualified as far a.s an 
expert in the price of that, s·o I would leave that 
to tl1e Court's decision as far as the experts are 
concerned." (Tr.-22) 
The Landowner did testify later in the trial that 
he felt that the value of the land other than the commer-
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cial site near the State line is $10,000.00 ( Tr.-53). This 
is not materially greater than the Sta;te's appraisal. 
There was no other t·estimony by the Landowner or 
witnesses on his behalf that would contradict that figure. 
~Ir. Froerer testified that the lands next to the State 
line were worth $65.00 an acre (Tr.-74). His t·estimony 
as to the remaining 76 acres was not materially contested 
in any way by the Landowner. The support of the State's 
testimony by testimony of the Landowner would negate 
any prejudicial effect of the Court's exclusion, State v. 
Pete1-son, supra. 
The exclusion of a sales price by the Court was not 
error and did not prejudice the State. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ALLOW THE 
LANDOWNER TO BRING BEFORE THE 
JURY ANY FACTS RELATING TO THE 
USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS THAT WOULD 
CONSTITUTE ERROR. 
The State alleges that the trial court erred prejudi-
cially in allowing the respondent to bring before the jury 
the fact that Federal funds were in~olved in the condem-
nation. The ·testimony about which the State complains is 
the cross-examination of the State's witness Mr. Adams 
concerning his employment, rut page 96 orf the transcript 
as follows: 
"Q. Mr. Adams in working for the Road 
Commission you work on these interstate federal 
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highways, I suppose on the appraisals. Is that 
right¥ 
~\. I work all over the State, whether it is 
federal, secondary or truck. 
Q. This is one of the federal interstate high-
ways? 
... \. That's correct. 
(~. And is part of your salary paid by Fed-
eral funds 1 
:Mr. Johnson: Objection, Your Honor. 
A. The check-
The Court: Just a minute. The object IS 
overruled. Go ahead, if you stand up. 
• • • 
A. ~Iy check comes from the State. I don't 
know what percentage-
Q. But you know as a matter of fact it is 
partially paid by federal funds 1 
A. I guess if I was on the federal job I 
would be. 
Q. ~\nd these appraisals are on f,ederal jobs' 
A. This is federal highway." ( Tr.-96, 97) 
The ~tate cites as authority for the allegation of 
error Jeu.,en v. South Carolina Sta.te Highway Depart-
ment. 236 S.C. -t2±, 114 S.E. 2d 591, 1960. In that case, 
the ~upreme Court of that State stated that it would 
be improper to admit the sources of funds for the pay-
ment of the runount of the verdict. There was no such 
testimony in tllis case. 
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The State also c~tes as authority State v. Salt Lake 
City Board of Education, 13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P. 2d -±GS, 
1962. In that c:a,~se this Court did not hold that the pub-
lic source of funds in a condemnation proceeding is not 
admissible as evidence. The court in fact held at page 
59 that: 
"While the fact that the Fedei"al government 
is participating in the cos-t hec;ause the road is for 
the benefit of the entire nation, has no bearing 
on determination of the legal issues involved and 
would not be admissible in evidence, it does point 
up dramatic;ally how inc;ongruous and inequitable 
it would be to impose the entire cost of the right 
of way upon this individual school board." 
The court in that case was addressing itself to the 
question of whether one public agency ''ras required to 
pay compensat'ion for lands taken from another public 
agency and not the question of whether bringing before 
the jury the fact that Federal funds are involved is pre-
judicial error. 
The testinwny adduced by the Landowner on cross-
examination did not state or imply that the verdict in that 
case would be paid by Federal funds. There "-as testi-
mony that the highway project is an interstate highway 
project. This is certainly not error under the cases re-
lied upon by the State. Counsel for the State himself 
stated that this was an inters,tate· high·way (Tr.-45), thus 
implying that it was a Federal project. :Moreover, on the 
motion of the State the jury visited the site of the land 
being taken and ·were able to view first hand that the 
project would be a widening of an existing U.S. Federal-
aid Highway. 
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rrhe intPl'l'Og_-ation of an eXpPrt witneSS as to his 
PmploymPnt and t liP source of his salary is certainly 
propPr ('ro~~-Pxamination. It goes to the credibility of 
thP wittH'~~. r(,he jury i:-; PntitlPd to this information to 
tletPrminP if thPre i:-; bin~, (III JFiymore on Evidence, 
Third l~~dition, ~PC'. 9-!9, p. 501, See. ~)(i(i, p. 3:2-±, et seq.). 
POINT III. 
rr1n~ l't > URT DID NOT ERR IN ALLO.\VING 
rrHE LANDO\VNER TO BRIXG BEFORE 
rrlLE JURY E\TlD1~NCI1J OF NEGOTIA-
rrlo~~ \YITH YARIOUS OIL COl\lPANIES. 
The position of the defendants in tllis case is that a 
8nulll pan·el of the land being taken -adj-acent to the state 
liiw po~~P~~t'd distinct and special value for cornn1ercial 
purpo~('::; by n'n~on of its proximity to the state line. 
'!'he ~t:de ·~ allegation of error in bringing before the 
jury negotiations with various oil companies is indie8!tive 
of the ~tatp'::; position in refusing to recognize any spe-
eial value of the lands by reason of the state line location. 
The Landowner, :Jir. \Voolley, testified thak the land 
<·lu~l' to the state line was specially valuable for commer-
eial purpose~ and particularly for service station pur-
po::;p~ ( Tr.-1-l-, 11. 18). He testified that the state line 
location i~ particularly valuable beeause of a difference 
of priee of gasoline between \Vyon1ing and Utah (Tr.-
1'). He also tPstified as to his negotiations with oil 
rompanies, thus showing a possible scheme of develop-
nwnt for the purpose for which the land is most valuable 
ITr.-1-t. 15, 16). :Jir. Tozer, property repres'entative of 
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the Standard Oil Company of Calif.ornia, testified on 
behalf of the Landowner that the particular land wa~ 
specially valuable for service station purposes (Tr.-65) 
and that one re-ason fior the special value was because 
the loc-ation was similar to other locations at state lines 
(Tr.-66). Mr. Aaron, a garage operator, service station 
operator and real estate operator with special training 
in the real estate field, testified that the highest and best 
use of the prope.rty being taken is commercial and that 
the property would be valuable for se·rvice station prop-
erty (Tr.-58, 59) and that the state line location has 
certain advantages such as attraction to tourists and to 
people who buy gasoline and like products (Tr.-60). 
None of this testimony was error. In determining the 
market value of a piece of real property for the puposes 
of the taking by eminent d01nain it is not merely the 
value of the property for the use to which it has been 
applied by the orwner that should be taken into considera-
tion. The possibility of its use for all purposes, present 
and prospective, for whieh it is adapted and to which 
it might in reason be applied 1nust be considered. Its 
value for the use to which men of prudence and wisdom 
and having adequate means would devote the property 
if owned by them must be taken as the ultimate test, 4 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, 12.314 . .All 
fa0tors hearing on the value o.f the land that any prudent 
purchaser wo·uld take into account should be given con-
sideration, including any potential development in the 
area reasonably to be expected, Weber Bast"n Water 
Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 349 P. 2d 
862,1960. 
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Proof of actual, reasonable or intrinsic value of 
the property may be shown by the V'alue of its uses, its 
particular fitness for such uses and its adaptability for 
any otltPr uses or purposes and the reasonable value 
thereof. .\ witness 1nay give his opinion o.f the value 
of such property based on such uses and the value there-
of when it has been shown that he has some knowledge 
of ~ twh uses beyond that of the jurors. Thus evidence 
of the market value of the property for the best and 
mo~t profitable use to which it may be devoted in the 
rtla~onably near future is admissible, 5 Nichols on Emi-
nnlf Domain, Third Edition, 18.11 (2). 
A~ bearing on the issues of the highest and best use 
for a potential use the owner of the land may offe'r a 
plan showing a possible scheme of development for the 
purpose for which the land is most available, provided 
it appears that the likelihood of demand for the property 
for that purpose is such as to affect market value, 
3 Xichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, 18.11 (2). 
The plan of development testified to by the Landowner 
was amply supported by testimony of experts in the field. 
lloreover, the Landowner is qualified to express his 
opinion as to value and as to the possibilities of the land 
for use. It is generally held that the Landowner has a 
reasonably good idea of what the land is worth. The 
, weight of his testin1ony is for the jury, 5 Nichols on Emi-
tk'nt Domain, lS.-1 (3). 
1 ~he. testimony brought before the jury relating to 
negotiations with oil companies was clearly admissible 
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in support of the testimony of the highest and best use 
of the land, the Landowne-r's p~an of development and of 
the market value. No testimony whatever was adduced 
as to the possible income from a commercial venture 
on the land or any other matter thrut would be considered 
a speculative enterprise or a speculative future use of the 
property. 
POINT IV. 
THE TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE 
LANDOWNER'S CASE l\iORE THAN ADE-
QUATELY JUSTIFIED A VERDICT OF 
TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS. 
The State's allegation that witnesses of the Land-
owner were unqualified is cornpletely without merit. 
The State attacks the qualifications of the witness, 
John Aaron, for the reason that he does not live in Utah 
and had done no selling in Utah, and concludes that ~Ir. 
Aaron was thus not acquainted with market conditions 
in Utah. _Mr. Aaron had r.esided in the area of Evanston, 
vVyoming for the last 23 years ( Tr.-53) and has been in 
the real estate and service station business for 18 years 
( Tr.-53) in the s·mne area in which he has lived. His busi-
ness operations extend into Utah ('Tr.-54). Evanston, 
Wyoming, is only five miles from the location of the land 
which is being taken. Contrast this to the faCJt that the 
State's witne'Sses live and work in Salt Lake, L~ayton and 
Ogden, Utah, which are 90 to 100 miles from the land 
being taken. l\lr. Aaron testified adequately as to his 
familiarity with land values for service station property 
and as to his special training and qualifications in real 
rstate 1natters (Tr.-5-l:, 55). The assertion of the State 
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thu.t ~lr . .~.\aron wa~ not acquainted with market condi-
tion:-; in l · tah and as a result is not an expert as to Utah 
market ,·a hlP has no ha~is in law or fact. 
'rhe ~tatp's attac·k on the qualifications and testi-
mony of ~L r. rrozt>r is centered around the fact that his 
initial appraisal was 1nade some years ago, namely, 1956 
and 1 ~r11 (Tr.-G4). However, that particular allegation 
ha:-~ no merit for the reason that :Mr. T'Ozer has further 
Pxaminetl and seen the properly and has since that date 
~tudie<l the operations of the existing service station 
directly aeroHs the state line (Tr.-65). Moreover, the 
State t'L'rtainly would not suggest that property values 
have decreased since 1956 and 1957 in the area of the 
land that is being taken. 
All three of the witnesses testifying on behalf of 
tht> Landowner testified as to the value of the property 
for a ~pPeial use. Such value may be testified to by per-
~nn~ familiar with the use to which the property is adapt-
~·d. En•n if the Court should decide that the witnesses 
are not familiar with land values generally, if a witness 
by reason of his skill, learning or teehnical training un-
dt>r~tands the adaptability of the lands in question for a 
particular purpose and the demand for land for such 
pnrpo~e. he may state the market value of the land. This 
i~ true l)Yl'n though he may be entirely unacquainted with 
thtl other elements which would be considered by differ-
iS· ent buyers competing for the same property, 5 Nichols 
ou Eminent Doma:in, Third Edition, 18.41 (3). 
The ~tate even attacks the theory advanc-ed by the 
~; defendants as spurious for the reason that there exists 
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many miles of highWJay frontage fron1 which a prospec-
tive buyer could ehoose. Again, the S.tate completelt 
overlooks the undisputed testimony of three witnesses 
that the land has special value for commercial purposes 
by reason of its proximity to the S'tate line. There is noth-
ing incredible, impossible or improbable about the testi-
mony of the Landowner's witness. On the other hand, 
the award of the jury was r·eas~on.able or even conserva-
tive in view of the expert testimony of the value of the 
property. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did not commit error and there was 
no improbability in the Landowner's testimony and ac-
cordingly the jury verdict and judgment of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON 
HOWARD L. EDWARDS 
65 South Main St. 
S.alt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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